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FROM PEACE CAMPAIGNS TO
PEACEOCRACY: ELECTIONS, ORDER AND
AUTHORITY IN AFRICA
GABRIELLE LYNCH, NIC CHEESEMAN AND JUSTIN WILLIS*
ABSTRACT
Research on Kenya’s 2013 elections has suggested that a “peace narra-
tive” was deliberately promoted by an establishment elite to delegitimize
protest and justify the use of excessive force. It has also tended to see the
Kenyan case as exceptional and to assume that such a narrative was only
possible because of the 2007/2008 post-election violence. We agree that
peace campaigns are often particularly intense in the wake of violence
and that they can be manipulated to generate a “peaceocracy”, a system
in which an emphasis on peace is used to prioritize stability and order to
the detriment of democracy. However, by comparing Kenya to Ghana
and Uganda, two countries that have had very diﬀerent experiences of
elections and election-related violence, we demonstrate that peace messa-
ging is neither unique to countries that have experienced recent electoral
conﬂict, nor a recent phenomenon. Instead, we highlight the pervasive-
ness of peace narratives across the sub-continent, which we show is due
to a number of factors. These include but are not limited to the way that
elections are used to assert and perform state autonomy and an asso-
ciated ideal of elections as orderly processes; the capacity of multiple
actors to instrumentalize the ideal of orderly elections; a popular fear of
electoral violence even in countries where it is rare; a growing tendency
to individualize responsibility for peace; and the availability of inter-
national funding. Taken together, these factors help to explain the rise of
peace messaging. At the same time, we argue that the risk that this mes-
saging will foster a “peaceocracy” varies markedly and that the likelihood
*Gabrielle Lynch is Professor of Comparative Politics at the University of Warwick (G.
Lynch@warwick.ac.uk), Nic Cheeseman is Professor of Democracy at the University of
Birmingham (n.cheeseman@bham.ac.uk), Justin Willis is Professor in History at the
University of Durham (justin.willis@durham.ac.uk). Research for this article was supported
by the UK Economic and Social Research Council under grant ES/L002345/1, ‘The impact
of elections in sub-Saharan Africa’. From 2020, surveys and anonymised interview tran-
scripts will, where ethically possible, be available from the ESRC data archive. The authors
are grateful for the comments provided by many colleagues and two anonymous reviewers
on earlier versions of this paper. We would also like to recognize the excellent research assist-
ance provided by Samuel Kweku Yamoah in Ghana; Mwongela Kamencu and Kevin
Obware in Kenya; and Ezron Muhumuza, Arthur Owor and Zed Sekitto in Uganda.
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of incumbent manipulation is greatest in countries with a recent history
of civil conﬂict and where the quality of democracy is already low.
FEW COUNTRIES HAVE WITNESSED SUCH A HEAVY and intense focus on
peace as Kenya in the run up to the country’s 2013 general election.
Following widespread post-election violence in 2007–2008 in which over
1,000 people lost their lives and almost 700,000 were displaced, political
leaders, civil society groups, media houses and international donors joined
forces to preach peace. The resulting campaigns were initially lauded as
successful, largely because the election and its aftermath resulted in sig-
niﬁcantly fewer deaths. However, ‘[i]n the wake of the elections, and their
dubious conduct, more critical commentators and civil society groups
began to ask whether the peace narrative was manipulated by the govern-
ment in order to marginalize opposition voices—and whether those who
promoted the peace narrative were therefore complicit’.1 More speciﬁc-
ally, scholars have argued that some actors consciously promoted a peace
narrative in order to justify a closing of the democratic space and delegit-
imization of protest in the name of stability,2 a situation that Kenyans
began to refer to as “peaceocracy”.
This literature draws attention to potential tensions between peace and
democracy, but it tends to see Kenya as exceptional and to assume that
such a narrative was a direct consequence of the severity of the 2007–2008
post-election violence. In turn, scholarship on peace messaging more
broadly has tended to focus on the eﬃcacy of particular programmes,3 or
when it has identiﬁed general shortcomings, to have focused on issues such
as the reinforcement of existing power relations4 or failure to address the
drivers of conﬂict,5 and has said less about peace messaging around elec-
tions or the impact of peace messaging on democracy per se.
Little attention has thus been given to how peace campaigns are neither
unique to countries that have experienced recent electoral conﬂict, and
the implications of this for processes of democratic consolidation. This is
important since, while peace campaigns may peak in the wake of violence,
1. Nic Cheeseman, Jacinta Mwende, and Seth Ouma, ‘Peace but at what cost? Media
coverage of elections and conﬂict in Kenya’, forthcoming in Katrin Voltmer (ed.), Media,
Conﬂict and Democratization (Palgrave, London, 2019).
2. Jacinta Maweu, ‘“Peace propaganda”? The application of Chomsky’s propaganda model
to the Daily Nation’s coverage of the 2013 Kenyan elections’, Communicatio 43, 2 (2017),
pp. 168–186.
3. Gadi Wolfsfeld, Media and the Path to Peace. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2004); Robert A. Hackett, ‘Is peace journalism possible? Three frameworks for assessing
structure and agency in news media’, Conﬂict & Communication 5, 2 (2006), pp. 1–13.
4. Adam Branch ‘The violence of peace: Ethnojustice in northern Uganda’, Development
and Change 45, 3 (2014), pp, 608–630, p. 609.
5. Cheeseman et al, ‘Peace but at what cost?’.
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they have a long history and are an increasingly common feature of multi-
party elections across sub-Saharan Africa. This includes peace messaging,
whereby politicians and voters alike are called upon to campaign, vote and
accept election results without resorting to the use of violence, as well as
other targeted peace-building eﬀorts, from inter-community dialogue
meetings to activities that seek to engage potential participants in violence.
For example, during Sierra Leone’s 2018 election there was ‘a strong civil
society and public response centred on peace and unity messaging’,6
which, among other things, reminded ‘political parties of their responsibil-
ities to both preach and practise non-violence’.7 Similarly, in Nigeria,
‘national actors and the international community supported the [2015]
electoral process with strong conﬂict mitigation measures including risk
analysis, preventive mediation and peace messaging’;8 while women in
Côte d’Ivoire designed peace pagnes (local cloths) ahead of their 2015
election as part of a multi-sector campaign for peace.9
The near ubiquity of such campaigns across the sub-continent, includ-
ing in relatively peaceful countries such as Ghana along with mainland
Tanzania,10 along with their long history, demonstrates that the phenom-
enon is not restricted to “post-conﬂict” or “transitional” settings and can-
not simply be explained by recent experiences of violence. Indeed, from
the authors’ close observation of elections in Ghana (2016), Kenya (2007,
2013 and 2017) and Uganda (2016), it was notable that the intensity of
peace campaigns around Ghana’s 2016 election was second only to that
witnessed in Kenya in 2013. This reality begs two important questions:
why do people invest in electoral peace campaigns across such diﬀerent
contexts, and with what consequences? We draw on the cases of Ghana,
Kenya and Uganda to answer these questions because, while these cases
are not wholly representative of sub-Saharan Africa, they feature consider-
able variation in the extent to which they have experienced political
6. Jamie Hitchen and Kieran Mitton, ‘And what for future generations in Sierra Leone’ 26
March 2018, Africa Is A Country, <https://africasacountry.com/2018/03/and-what-for-future-
generations-in-sierra-leone> (11 March 2019).
7. European Union, ‘Election Observation Mission Presidential, Parliamentary and Local
Council Elections 2018, preliminary statement’, 3 April 2018, <https://eeas.europa.eu/
election-observation-missions/eom-sierra-leone-2018/41118/preliminary-statement-eu-eom-
presidential-parliamentary-and-local-councils-elections_en> (11 March 2019), p. 8.
8. Nkwachukwu Orji & Kelechi C. Iwuamadi (n.d.), ‘Conﬂict mitigation in Nigeria’s 2015
elections: Lessons in democratic development’, Unpublished Conference Paper, <http://
www.inecnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Conference-Paper-by-Kelechi-Iwuamadi.
pdf> (11 March 2019), p. 2.
9. USAID, ‘Fabric Design Sends Message to Côte d’Ivoire’s Voters’, 7 June 2018,<https://
www.usaid.gov/results-data/success-stories/creating-fabric-c%C3%B4te-d%E2%80%99ivoire
%E2%80%99s-peaceful-future> (11 March 2019).
10. Bernando Venturi, ‘Preventing violence in a “peaceful” country: The case of
Tanzania’, Agency for Peacebuilding, 12 April 2016, <http://www.peaceagency.org/en/2016/04/
12/preventing-violence-tanzania/> (11 March 2019).
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stability and conﬂict. While Kenya has experienced both civil conﬂict and
state repression around elections, widespread civil conﬂict has not taken
place in recent Ugandan polls, and Ghanaian elections have been com-
paratively—though not wholly—peaceful. These three cases therefore
exemplify the prominence of electoral peace campaigns in very diﬀerent
contexts. At the same time, they allow us to hold certain important vari-
ables constant—such as the colonial power, type of electoral system, and
the uninterrupted holding of multiparty elections over the last decade.
Through this comparative approach we demonstrate that peace narra-
tives may emerge even in largely peaceful states for ﬁve main reasons.
First, mass elections by secret ballot perform an imagined distinction
between state and society that foregrounds a particular set of ideas about
peace and order.11 Second, multiple actors may instrumentalize the idea
of peace for their own purposes , including opposition politicians and acti-
vists who can insist on the need for peace to try and discipline incumbents
and security forces. These processes have often gone hand in hand with a
popular fear of violence even where it is rare; a growing tendency to indi-
vidualize responsibility for electoral peace; and, the availability of inter-
national funding. It is this combination of factors, we argue, and the way
in which they reinforce each other, that has made peace campaigns an
increasingly central part of contemporary elections. More speciﬁcally,
while the ﬁrst three (orderly elections, political instrumentalization and the
fear of violence) justify a focus on peace; the fourth (a focus on short-term
prevention mechanisms and individualization of responsibility) helps to
explain the emphasis on peace messaging instead of, or in addition to,
other peace-building eﬀorts; and the ﬁfth (international support) explains
the ﬁnancial backing that has facilitated a proliferation of peace campaigns.
These various factors help to explain the attraction of peace campaigns
to a variety of audiences and thus their pervasiveness. But these cam-
paigns have not served everyone’s interests equally. Instead, they tend to
play to the advantage of incumbent elites. As noted, elections are envi-
saged as moments of bureaucratic order, when individuals are registered,
vote and their preferences are counted.12 However, they also carry a threat
of disorder and instability: campaigns may become divisive, the state’s
capacity and neutrality may come into question, and citizens may reject
results. In turn, while various actors may emphasize the importance of
peace in a bid to discipline others, this strategy is particularly appealing to
11. Thomas Bierschenk and Jean-Pierre Oliver de Sardan, ‘Studying the dynamics of
African bureaucrats: An introduction to states at work’, in Thomas Bierschenk and Jean-
Pierre Oliver de Sardan (ed.), States at work. Dynamics of African bureaucracies (Brill, Leiden,
2014), pp. 3–32.
12. Justin Willis, ‘“Peace and order are in the interest of every citizen”: Elections, violence
and state legitimacy in Kenya, 1957–74’, The International Journal of African Historical Studies
48, 1 (2015), pp. 99–116.
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incumbent politicians, civil servants and security forces who—due to their
relationship with the state—can claim to have a legitimate monopoly over
violence and to be able to ensure order and stability. Of course, the ideal
of state autonomy that this rests upon often sits in dramatic tension with
what the state does: public campaigns for peace can exist alongside sub-
stantial levels of violence, whether committed by uniformed forces, state-
sponsored militias or thugs. Nevertheless, this ideal facilitates the use of
peace campaigns to help sustain the status quo. This occurs when, for
example, establishment elites present political continuity as the best guar-
antor of peace; close oﬀ certain topics of debate on the grounds that they
might trigger violence; and delegitimize public protests and legal chal-
lenges against perceived electoral manipulation in the name of maintain-
ing public order. When this serves to shut down democratic debate and
curtail the rights of opposition parties and their supporters a peaceocracy
can be said to exist. Our case studies suggest that such manipulation tends
to be more pernicious in more authoritarian regimes with a recent history
of intense civil conﬂict in which incumbents are both highly motivated to
use every means available to win and better placed to manipulate peace
messaging to suppress opposition. This is due, for example, to their con-
siderable control over the media and civil society, and people’s heightened
concern with stability including that of the international community.
In showing how peace can be manipulated, we draw on Johan
Galtung’s distinction between ‘negative peace’, characterized by the
absence of direct violence, and ‘positive peace’, which requires dealing
with the underlying hostilities, inequalities, and injustices that can pro-
mote conﬂict.13 This distinction is important as it highlights how a nega-
tive peace can be threatened by the absence of a more substantive positive
peace, but also how—against a backdrop of widespread violence—a nega-
tive peace can often be regarded as a widely accepted priority. However,
popular perceptions of peace and violence are also aﬀected by ideas of
legitimate force, with many citizens and leaders accepting that an individ-
ual, and in turn a state, can legitimately use force against others if their
actions are deemed necessary and proportionate given the threat faced.
While such sentiments are central to the idea of the modern state, this
understanding of legitimate force opens a grey area for political debate
over the source and scale of threat, and the type and level of force that can
be deemed necessary and proportionate. It is in this grey zone that the
potential violence of peace emerges, in which the idea of peace is manipu-
lated to legitimize the use of power by some and delegitimize ostensibly
legal activities by others, such that peace, as Adam Branch has argued,
13. Johan Galtung, ‘Violence, peace, and peace research’, Journal of Peace Research 6, 3
(1969), pp. 167–191.
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becomes a ‘productive political violence, [which pushes] towards speciﬁc
possible futures, while cutting oﬀ others’.14 As will be shown, incumbents
tend to prioritize a negative peace—or short-term political stability and
reduction in the level of direct violence and deaths—to delegitimize oppos-
ition activities. Moreover, when such violence becomes a peaceocracy—in
which certain voices are marginalized and the opposition’s capacity to
meaningfully participate in the electoral process is curbed—the resulting
frustrations and grievances may fuel the prospects of future unrest.
In making these arguments, we do not seek to downplay the value of
peace or the costs of violence. Instead, we seek to highlight the capacity for
peace campaigns to be repressive: to close oﬀ political space, limit debate,
entrench the ruling party’s hold on power, and justify the use of force
against those who might cause disorder. This does not mean that peace
campaigns are worthless nor that they should be curtailed. Instead, our
aim is to show why they have become so pervasive and how they can come
into tension with democracy. However, before turning to these arguments,
we brieﬂy outline the electoral experience of the three country case studies.
Peace campaigns in historical and comparative perspective
Peace messaging peaked in Kenya around the 2013 election when the
newly instituted National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC)
worked with local administrators, organizations and networks to monitor
hate speech; media houses and international organizations trained journal-
ists on conﬂict-sensitive reporting and called for peace; theatre groups,
musicians, and public advertizing called upon Kenyans to vote in peace;
and politicians competed to display their peace-loving credentials.15
Indeed, while peace campaigns attracted signiﬁcant funding and support
from the Kenyan government, local organizations, external donors, and
ordinary citizens also promoted peace messages and admonished those
whose utterances or actions they feared might trigger violence.16
However, while such calls were particularly intense in 2013 in the wake of
the 2007/8 post-election crisis, they have a much longer history. On the eve
of the country’s independence elections in 1963, the departing governor
appealed to everyone ‘to maintain the peace’ and ‘ensure that this period
14. Branch, ‘The violence of peace’.
15. Nic Cheeseman, Gabrielle Lynch and Justin Willis, ‘Democracy and its Discontents:
Understanding Kenya’s 2013 elections’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 8, 1 (2014), pp.
2–24; Joyce Nyairo, ‘The circus comes to town: Performance, religion and exchange in polit-
ical party campaigns’, in Kimani Njogu and Peter Wafalu Wekesa (eds), Kenya’s 2013 elec-
tion: Stakes, practices and outcomes (Twaweza Communications Ltd, Nairobi, 2015), pp.
124–144.
16. Warigia Bowman and J. David Bowman, ‘Censorship or self-control? Hate speech, the
state and the voter in the Kenyan election of 2013’, Journal of Modern African Studies 54, 3
(2016), pp. 496–497.
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passes without violence or disorder’.17 This was later echoed by presidents
Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi, with calls for peace becoming par-
ticularly central to Moi’s one-party state (1978–1992) and to the ruling
Kenya African National Union’s (KANU’s) multi-party election campaign
in 1992. It was also evident during the country’s most recent elections in
2017 when a mix of dialogue meetings, speeches, music, art and theatre
were once again deployed as part of a campaign for peaceful polls.
In Uganda and Ghana, elections have also long been associated with
calls for peace. In Ghana’s 1969 election, for example, the National
Liberation Council (NLC)—which had come to power through the coup
that toppled President Nkrumah in 1966—sought a ‘peaceful and orderly’
electoral process.18 Similarly, President Museveni’s justiﬁcation of a ‘no-
party democracy’ in the late 1980s rested on the idea that multi-party pol-
itics fostered sectarianism, division and conﬂict.19 However, as in Kenya,
an emphasis on peace during elections in Ghana and Uganda has become
more vocal and widespread—and better funded—in recent years. Thus,
ahead of Uganda’s most recent elections in 2016, media houses, church
leaders, civil society organizations and the ruling National Resistance
Movement (NRM), regularly called upon the country’s citizens to keep
the peace,20 while elections in Ghana later the same year were character-
ized by even more intensive campaigns—from peace adverts on television,
radio and billboards and peace marches to touring plays and movies.
This emphasis on peace is common despite very diﬀerent experiences of
elections and election-related violence across our cases. Kenya’s unenviable
record of electoral violence began from a relatively low level with small-
scale confrontations between supporters of rival parties during the inde-
pendence elections of 1963 and relatively commonplace, but generally loca-
lized, intimidation during the country’s one-party state elections. Election-
related violence then increased following calls for, and then a return to,
multi-party politics in the early 1990s. This included ethnic clashes across
much of the Rift Valley from 1990 to 1993, the pre-election violence of
1997, the widespread post-election violence of 2007/8, and heavy-handed
state security response to post-election protests in 2017.21
17. Cited in Willis, ‘“Peace and Order are in the Interest of Every Citizen”’.
18. Daily Graphic, 11 August 1969, ‘Africa: NLC is encouraged’, p. 1.
19. Nelson Kasﬁr, ‘“No-party democracy” in Uganda’, Journal of Democracy 9, 2 (1998),
pp. 49–63; Aili Mari Tripp, Museveni’s Uganda: Paradoxes of power in a hybrid regime (Lynne
Reinner, Boulder, 2010).
20. Henni Alava and Jimmy. S. Ssentongo, ‘Religious (de)politicisation in Uganda’s 2016
elections’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 10, 4 (2016), pp. 677–692.
21. Charles Hornsby, Kenya: A history since independence (IB Tauris, London, 2013);
Gabrielle Lynch, I say to you: Ethnic politics and the Kalenjin of Kenya (University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 2011); KNCHR, Mirage at Dusk: A human rights account of the 2017 General
Election (KNCHR, Nairobi, 2017)
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In Uganda, late-colonial elections were marked by boycotts and intimi-
dation, while the 1980 elections saw extensive interference by the ruling
Military Commission, which ultimately led one of the losers—Yoweri
Museveni—to take up arms against the government. Following
Museveni’s rise to power in 1986, regular elections from 1996—and on a
multi-party basis from 2006—have seen a highly uneven playing ﬁeld with
a number—especially those in 2001 and 2006 –witnessing signiﬁcant
levels of violence.22 However, whereas in Kenya much of the election-
related violence in the 1990s and 2007/8 pitted local groups against each
other, violence around Uganda’s elections has largely been deployed by
the security forces against the political opposition.
In contrast, Ghana is widely hailed as a democratic success story with
elections that are increasingly peaceful, competitive and free.23 Thus,
while pre-independence elections in 1951, 1954 and 1956 were marked
by signiﬁcant violence,24 the elections in 1969 and 1979 that punctuated
military rule saw little conﬂict.25 Finally, regular multi-party elections
since 1992—though initially characterized by (mostly non-lethal) intimi-
dation in partisan strongholds—have become comparatively peaceful.26
So what explains why we see vigorous peace campaigns in contexts with
such diﬀerent experiences? To answer this question, the ﬁrst two factors
—orderly elections and political instrumentalization—are discussed in the
next section, before we turn to the other three factors—the fear of vio-
lence, the individualization of responsibility, and international support.
The instrumentalization of an electoral ideal
In Africa, as elsewhere, elections are meant ‘to create the state as a distinct
entity and sphere of order, even as it creates the voter as the subject of
that order’.27 However, this ideal of elections as moments when an
autonomous state oversees an orderly bureaucratic process is constantly
threatened by the possibility, or reality, of disorder—either as a result of
unruly campaigns, state failings, or a popular rejection of oﬃcial results.
22. Tripp,Museveni’s Uganda.
23. Peter Arthur, ‘Democratic consolidation in Ghana: the role and contribution of the
media, civil society and state institutions’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 48, 2
(2010), pp. 203–226
24. Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana, 1946–60 (Oxford University Press, London, 1970),
pp. 273–274, pp. 291–292.
25. Naomi Chazan, ‘African voters at the polls: A re-examination of the role of elections in
African politics’, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 17, 2 (1979), pp. 136–158
26. George M. Bob-Milliar, ‘Party youth activists and low-intensity electoral violence in
Ghana: A qualitative study of party foot soldiers’ activism’, African Studies Quarterly 15, 1
(2014), pp. 125–152; E. Gyimah-Boadi, ‘Another step forward for Ghana’, Journal of
Democracy 20, 2 (2009), pp. 138–152.
27. Willis et al, ‘La machine électorale’, p. 27
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In turn, judgments as to whether elections are free and fair by both obser-
vers and commentators alike are heavily shaped by the occurrence of overt
violence or its absence, and by the orderliness of the country’s citizens.28
For example, ahead of Ghana’s 1969 election, the NLC sought a peace-
ful election that would ‘demonstrate to the world the political maturity of
Ghanaians’;29 while ahead of the country’s 1992 elections, a regional
administrator declared that the polls were ‘an opportunity for us to dem-
onstrate to the whole world that we are mature enough to do party polit-
ics’.30 Similarly, before Uganda’s 2001 elections, the government-owned
New Vision newspaper insisted that: ‘We must not embarrass ourselves.
Voting in a new leader is supposed to be a very peaceful exercise’.31 In
turn, the same newspaper celebrated the peacefulness of the 2001 poll as
evidence of its success.32
This call for a performance of order is often explicitly disciplinary: can-
didates and voters should behave in an orderly fashion as part of a per-
formance of the state’s capacity to oversee a sovereign nation and of the
citizen’s political maturity.33 It was this logic that led E. S. Atieno-
Odhiambo to write—in reference to post-colonial Kenya—of an ‘ideology
of order’ in which political stability is seen as the number one priority and
other factors such as civil liberties and political competition are sacriﬁced
on the altar of national unity.34 For the purposes of this paper such an
emphasis on order is important for two key reasons. First, it encourages
an evaluation of an election’s success that foregrounds order and stability
above transparency and credibility, and thus encourages a focus on peace.
Second, the inherent appeal of this demand for peace and order—and the
diﬃculty of rejecting it—ensures that peace campaigns can be instrumen-
talized to advance speciﬁc agendas. Indeed, competition for control of
peace messaging can be seen across our three country case studies, as
incumbents emphasise the state’s supposed legitimate monopoly over vio-
lence and ability to ensure order, while opposition leaders and civil society
groups draw on the public resonance of peace to challenge the legitimacy
of a government that relies on violence to maintain control and/or to
encourage incumbents to moderate their use of physical coercion by the
security forces and militias.
28. Justin Willis, Gabrielle Lynch and Nic Cheeseman, ‘“A valid electoral exercise?”:
Uganda’s 1980 elections and the observers’ dilemma’, Comparative Studies in Society and
History 59, 1 (2017), pp. 211–238.
29. Daily Graphic, 11 August 1969, ‘Africa: NLC is encouraged’, p. 1.
30. Cited in People’s Daily Graphic, 17 October 1992, ‘Educate supporters’, p. 3.
31. Sunday Vision, 11 March 2001, ‘Editorial: Give democracy a chance’, p. 10.
32. New Vision, 13 March 2001, ‘Editorial: Peaceful elections’, p. 12; advertisement,
Sunday Vision 18 March 2001.
33. Willis, ‘Peace and order’; Willis et al, ‘La machine électorale’.
34. E. S. Atieno-Odhiambo, ‘The ideology of order’, in Michael Schatzberg (ed.), The pol-
itical economy of Kenya (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1987), pp. 172–202.
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In this way, Kenya’s elections since the 1960s have witnessed a constant
reiteration of the link between order, peace and development, which the
government has used as both a legitimating and repressive device,35 but
which opposition politicians and civil society activists have also drawn on
to demand political reform. For example, in 1997, when opposition acti-
vists faced constant, almost routine, violence from police, administrators
and hired thugs, the opposition and some of the press insisted that
changes were needed to enhance security and stability.36 At the same
time, donors publicly called for ‘non-violent’ elections—a direct criticism
of the deployment of militias against voters.37 More recently, leaders
across the political divide sought to use the enhanced concern with peace
that followed the post-election violence of 2007/8 for their own political
gain.38
Similarly, in the Ghanaian elections of the 1990s the ruling NDC
responded to allegations of repression by issuing press statements that
depicted the government as an agent of peace and claimed that ‘the cul-
ture of violence in Ghanaian politics’ had been initiated by the political
antecedents of the main opposition grouping, the New Patriotic Party
(NPP).39 In response, the NPP accused President Rawlings of ‘creating a
platform for violence’—implicitly arguing that his manipulation of govern-
ment resources and oﬃcials had compromised the state’s claim to assert a
non-partisan order.40 Many elections in Uganda have witnessed a similar
dynamic as the NRM presents peace as the beneﬁcial result of its rule—
and threatens that voting for the opposition could engender violence—
while opposition politicians, civil society actors, and donors draw atten-
tion to state repression and the need for reform.41
The ideal of elections as orderly and the capacity of both governments
and opposition parties to use peace narratives to advance their own inter-
ests thus helps to explain the persistence of peace messaging across both
time and space. However, while leaders often compete for control of the
35. Willis, ‘Peace and Order’.
36. For example, see Daily Nation, 6 July 1997, ‘Editorial: Reforms: dialogue is the only
way out’, pp. 6; Daily Nation, 8 July 1997, ‘Editorial: Govt must defuse this ticking bomb’,
p. 6.
37. Daily Nation, 2 December 1997, ‘US keen on free poll says Jackson’, p. 1.
38. Gabrielle Lynch, ‘Electing the “alliance of the accused”: The success of the Jubilee
Alliance in Kenya’s Rift Valley’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 8, 1 (2014), pp. 93–114;
Nic Cheeseman, Gabrielle Lynch and Justin Willis, ‘Voting for the devil you know: Kenya’s
2017 election’, Review of African Political Economy blog, 14 August 2017, <http://roape.net/
2017/08/14/voting-devil-know-kenyas-2017-election/> (11 January 2017).
39. People’s Daily Graphic, 12 October 1992, ‘NDC press statement’, p. 10.
40. People’s Daily Graphic, 5 October 1992b, ‘Rawlings asked to step down’, p. 3 People’s
Daily Graphic, 10 October 1992, ‘Obeng condemns pastoral letter’, p. 3.
41. For example, Human Rights Watch, ‘Uganda: Suspend ‘Crime Preventers”, 12 January
2016, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/12/uganda-suspend-crime-preventers> (12
February 2017).
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peace narrative, this contest does not take place on a level playing ﬁeld;42
an underlying reality that lays the foundations for the rise of peaceocracy.
However, before turning to the greater ability of incumbents to instru-
mentalize these processes, we outline three additional factors that contrib-
ute to the pervasiveness of peace messaging.
The terror of history
The ability of a range of actors to instrumentalize peace is only possible
because such messages resonate with a wider public, which has consist-
ently exhibited a deep fear that elections will descend into disorder and
violence. This is perhaps unsurprising in contexts such as Kenya but it is
also evident in countries such as Ghana where elections have been rela-
tively peaceful. Thus, in a nationally representative survey conducted by
the authors in Ghana (September 2015), Uganda (December 2015) and
Kenya (June 2017), we asked participants ‘What is the most important
factor for an election to be free and fair?’.43 Although the question lists a
number of factors related to the result, including ballot box stuﬃng and
voter bribery, the most common response in all three countries was: ‘A
peaceful process’ (see Table 1). This prioritization appears particularly
stark when one considers that only a small minority of respondents had
actually experienced election-related violence during the previous polls
(see Table 2).
Similarly in a survey commissioned by the Africa Centre for Open
Governance (AfriCOG) shortly after Kenya’s 2013 election, 50.9 percent
of respondents said that ‘peace is more important than free and fair elec-
tions’. In line with our own survey ﬁndings, people who answered ‘yes’ to
this question were also more likely to assess the election as having been free
Table 1 Most important factor for an election to be free and fair, top three
responses (%)
Ghana Kenya Uganda
A peaceful process 20 26 17
Secret ballot 16 20 16
Independent Electoral Commission 15 14 14
42. Lise Rakner and Nicolas Van de Walle, ‘Opposition weakness in Africa’, Journal of
Democracy 20, 3 (2009), pp. 108–121.
43. This survey—the same in each country—was conducted as part of the authors’ wider
project on attitudes towards elections; in each case this was a nationwide face-to-face survey,
conducted by a professional polling organization using random sampling techniques. The
Ghana and Uganda surveys had national samples of 2,000 respondents; the Kenya survey
had a national sample of 1,100.
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and fair.45 Signiﬁcantly, a second survey conducted in the wake of Kenya’s
2013 polls also found that when voters were asked ‘whether they thought
that it was more important to preserve peace, even if the wrong person
were declared the winner’, the vast majority—85 percent—said yes.46
This popular prioritization of peace reﬂects a widespread sense that
electoral chaos is a real and pressing threat. For example, a survey con-
ducted a month before Kenya’s 2013 election found that ‘[m]ore than a
ﬁfth of the sample expected election-related violence to occur in their areas
in 2013; almost a sixth thought that their own families would suﬀer because
of it; and nearly a sixth reported that violence had already taken place’.47
This was not an isolated concern: many voters raised fears of widespread
election-related violence ahead of the recent polls in Kenya in August
2017,48 in Uganda in February 2016,49 and in Ghana in December 2016.
Indeed, in the latter a majority of citizens reported concerns that the polls
would be accompanied by violence, which turned out not to be the case.50
In line with popular anxieties, local analysts argued that the greatest threat
to the stability of Ghana’s democracy ‘derives from electoral violence,
underpinned by hate speech, abusive language, and the use of spirituality
in politics’. More broadly, election-related violence was frequently cast as
‘a recurring issue that continues to push Ghana to the brink of all-out vio-
lence during the preparations toward each election year’.51
Table 2 Did you suﬀer actual violence in the last election?44
Yes No Refused
Ghana 6% 94% 0%
Kenya 11% 89% 0%
Uganda 4% 96% 0%
44. Given the timing of the surveys, respondents would have been referring to the 2011
elections in Ghana and Uganda and 2013 elections in Kenya.
45. Shah, ‘Free and fair?’.
46. James D. Long, Karuti Kanyinga, Karen E. Feree and Clark Gibson, ‘Choosing peace
over democracy’, Journal of Democracy 24, 3 (2013), p. 151.
47. Ibid.
48. William Mwangi, ‘70% Kenyans in fear of post-election violence in 2017—survey’, The
Star, 2 November 2016, <http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/11/02/70-kenyans-in-fear-of-
post-election-violence-in-2017-survey_c1447872> (12 February 2017).
49. Human Rights Watch, ‘Uganda: Suspend ‘Crime Preventers”.
50. CDD-Ghana, ‘Ghana’s 2016 Elections: Prospects for Credibility and Peacefulness’, 16
November 2016, <https://drive.google.com/ﬁle/d/0ByAq4dHfpyAtRlV0aFJJR2ZFcFk/view>
(12 February 2017).
51. Kwesi Aning and Kwaku Danso, ‘Introduction’, in Kwesi Aning, Kwaku Danso and
Naila Salihu (eds), Managing election-related conﬂict and violence for democratic stability in
Ghana II (Koﬁ Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra, 2016), pp. 1–9,
pp. 2–3.
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In Kenya and Uganda these fears were shaped, at least in part, by
experiences and memories of election-related violence and of political
instability—both those experienced ﬁrst-hand and those recalled through
popular narratives and media images. Fear of election violence is thus dri-
ven not only by present realities, but also by what Dirk Moses has called
‘the terror of history’: a fear of the past’s eternal return.52 Ahead of
Kenya’s 2013 and 2017 elections, this terror focused on the possibility
that past conﬂict would be repeated,53 a worry that was fuelled by the
persistence of grievances that motivated the 2007/8 violence and by an
extremely close election that was contested, as in 2007, between an
“establishment Kikuyu” and “opposition Luo”. It was also informed by
the fact that, while the 2007/8 post-election violence had been unprece-
dented in its intensity and geographic scope, all of Kenya’s previous
multi-party elections—including the 2002 election, which is often hailed
as largely peaceful—had been marked by signiﬁcant violence.54
In Uganda, election-related fears have also focused on past trauma and,
more speciﬁcally, on the possibility that the country could return to the
wars of the 1980s and 1990s, which were prompted by a disputed election
in 1980 when Yoweri Museveni—then the leader of the opposition
Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM)—rejected the result. As we shall see,
President Museveni and the NRM have used the spectre of a possible
return to the chaos and disorder of the 1980s as a way to mobilize sup-
port, but also to delegitimize the political opposition by presenting it as a
threat to the country’s fragile peace. At the same time, others fear that an
electoral dispute could trigger riots and demonstrations and a heavy-
handed security crackdown.55
By contrast, Ghanaians have experienced relatively low levels of
election-related violence since the return to multi-party politics in 1992.
Nevertheless, the threat of civil conﬂict has been powerful, as is evident
from a public statement by Ghana’s National Commission for Democracy
ahead of the 1992 elections in which the research organization conﬁdently
asserted that, ‘peace to most Ghanaians now is far more important than
52. A. Dirk Moses, ‘Genocide and the terror of history’, Parallax 17, 4 (2011), pp.
90–108, p. 91.
53. International Crisis Group, Kenya’s 2013 Elections, Africa Report No. 197, 17 January
2013; The Conversation, 23 April 2017, ‘Kenya’s history of election violence is threatening to
repeat itself’, by Sekou Toure Otondi, <https://theconversation.com/kenyas-history-of-
election-violence-is-threatening-to-repeat-itself-76220> (12 February 2017).
54. Africa Watch, Divide and rule: State sponsored ethnic violence in Kenya (Human Rights
Watch, New York, 1993), p. 1; Peter Kagwanja, ‘Politics of marionettes: Extra-legal violence
and the 1997 elections in Kenya’, in Marcel Rutten, Alamin Mazrui and Francois Grignon
(eds), Out for the count: The 1997 General Elections and prospects for democracy in Kenya
(Fountain Publishers, Kampala, 2001), pp. 72–101; Patrick Mutahi, ‘Political violence in the
elections’, in Herve Maupeu, Musambayi Katumanga and Winnie Mitullah (eds), The Moi
succession: The 2002 elections in Kenya (Transafrica Press, Nairobi, 2005), pp. 69–96, p. 73.
55. Human Rights Watch, ‘Uganda: Suspend Crime Preventers’.
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who or which political party will win the forthcoming elections’;56 com-
ments that were echoed during our research around the country’s 2016
elections. In the absence of widespread electoral violence, this focus on
peace has been stoked less by the memory of historical conﬂict and more
by examples of unrest and civil strife in neighbouring states. In turn, con-
cerns that Ghana might follow the path of Côte d’Ivoire or Nigeria have
been intensiﬁed by a keen awareness that although Ghanaian elections
have rarely attracted international news coverage they have often been
accompanied by low-level violence.
Thus, even though analysts generally recognize that the country ‘has
not recorded widespread election violence’, they argue that ‘the political
climate leading up to elections has … been tense,57 and that ‘the increas-
ing incidence of electoral violence … could push Ghana to the brink of
armed violence’.58 Commonly noted problems include the use of abusive
language,59 the pervasiveness of threats and intimidation,60 the role of
hired thugs or “machomen” in disrupting political campaigns or voting,61
and the relationship between ethnic tensions, chieftaincy battles and elect-
oral logics in parts of the north.62 These problems are widely interpreted
as evidence that, if care is not taken, Ghana could easily suﬀer the same
fate as other less fortunate countries from Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso
to Uganda and Zimbabwe.63 It is therefore clear that both the memory of
recent violence and the spectre of violence in nearby states serve as
56. Cited in People’s Daily Graphic, 5 October 1992, ‘NDC doesn’t believe in violence—
Rawlings’, p. 3.
57. N. Salihu, J. A. Osei-Tutu and Kwesi Aning, ‘Conclusion’, in Kwesi Aning, Kwaku
Danso and Naila Salihu (eds), Managing election-related conﬂict and violence for democratic sta-
bility in Ghana II (Koﬁ Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra, 2016),
pp. 192–196, pp. 193.
58. Kwaki Danso and Ernest Lartey, ‘Democracy on a knife edge: Ghana’s democratiza-
tion processes, institutional malaise and the challenge of electoral violence’, in Kwesi Aning
and Kwaku Danso (eds), Managing election-related violence for democratic stability in Ghana
(Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Ghana, Accra, 2012), pp. 33–60, p. 33.
59. Kwame Asamoah, ‘Demons of transitional democracies: Politics of insults and acri-
mony in Ghana’, Journal of Social Science Studies 1, 1 (2014), pp. 44–56; Gilbert Tietaah,
‘Use of abusive language in Ghanaian politics’, in Kwesi Aning and Kwaku Danso (eds),
Managing election-related violence for democratic stability in Ghana (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Ghana, Accra, 2012), pp. 211–241.
60. Danso and Lartey, ‘Democracy on a knife edge’.
61. Bob-Milliar, ‘Party youth activists and low-intensity electoral violence in Ghana’; F.
Edu-Aﬀul and S. Allotey-Pappoe, ‘Political vigilantism and electoral violence in Ghana’, in
Kwesi Aning, Kwaku Danso and Naila Salihu (eds), Managing election-related conﬂict and vio-
lence for democratic stability in Ghana II (Koﬁ Annan International Peacekeeping Training
Centre, Accra, 2016), pp. 63–84; p. 72.
62. Clementina Amankwaah, Election-related violence: The case of Ghana (Nordiska
Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, 2013); Jasper Ayelazuno, ‘The politicisation of the Mirigu-Kandiga
conﬂict in Ghana’s 2008 elections: Questioning the electoral peace paradigm’, Conﬂict
Trends 2 (2009), pp. 45–50.
63. Asamoah, ‘Demons of transitional democracies’; Jesse S. Ovadia, ‘Stepping back from
the brink: A review of the 2008 Ghanaian election from the capital of the northern region’,
Canadian Journal of African Studies 45, 2 (2011), pp. 310–340.
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powerful drivers of a preoccupation with peace. This is signiﬁcant because
it means that peace narratives are not simply reactive; rather, they reﬂect
deeper tropes regarding the potential for instability in Africa64 and hence
the overriding importance of order. In highlighting the complex drivers of
popular concerns over electoral violence our intention is not to dismiss
people’s fears. Indeed, it may well be that the consistent emphasis on
peace has, at least in part, helped Ghana to avoid widespread election-
related conﬂict. Instead, we emphasize how such fears are not simply a
natural or organic response to intense political competition, and how they
reinforce a concern that elections must be peaceful and orderly.
The individualization of responsibility
A fourth factor that helps to explain the pervasiveness of peace campaigns
around elections is the widespread recognition that it is extremely diﬃcult to
address the structural drivers of conﬂict and the resulting tendency to
emphasize personal responsibility for the outbreak of election violence. In
short, oft-cited drivers of unrest such as youth unemployment, narratives of
historical injustice, inequality, impunity, rogue security forces, and the pres-
ence of militias take decades to resolve, even if they are tackled head on. As a
result, popular and media analysis of the prospects for peace often emphasize
how, in challenging contexts, any kind of conﬂict risks escalation and main-
taining peace therefore requires the active eﬀort of all citizens. Together with
a growing focus on individual legal culpability for political violence and an
emphasis of Pentecostal churches on the role of individuals as an agent of
change, this has encouraged an emphasis on citizens’ personal responsibility
to guard against chaos and disorder. This is important as it helps to explain
why a focus on the need to avoid violence at all costs is so often articulated in
short-term peace campaigns such as peace messaging.
The Kenyan case demonstrates this trend particularly well.65 It was
widely accepted in the wake of the 2007/8 post-election violence that,
while the crisis had been triggered by a disputed election, it had been
fuelled by much more deep-rooted problems. These included a tendency
towards winner-takes-all politics, a culture of impunity, collective narra-
tives of historical injustice, high levels of inequality, a youth bulge, and
mass under-employment.66 The wide-ranging reforms introduced to
64. Nic Cheeseman, Democracy in Africa: Successes, failures, and the struggle for political reform
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015).
65. This section draws in part from Gabrielle Lynch, Performances of injustice: The politics of
truth, justice and reconciliation in Kenya (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018).
66. Daniel Branch and Nic Cheeseman, ‘Democratization, sequencing, and state failure in
Africa: Lessons from Kenya’, African Aﬀairs 108, 430 (2009), pp. 1–26; Lynch, I Say to You;
Susanne Mueller, ‘The political economy of Kenya’s crisis’, Journal of Eastern African Studies
2, 2 (2008), pp. 185–210.
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address these problems included a new constitution that brought in a
devolved system of government and classic transitional justice mechan-
isms, most notably the intervention of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) and establishment of a truth commission. However, as the 2013
election approached, it was clear that these institutional measures had not
resolved the mistrust between previously antagonistic communities, narra-
tives of historical injustice, or more general problems of gross inequality
and underemployment. As a result, the ‘spectre of election-related vio-
lence loomed large’,67 and pre-election peace-building interventions came
to emphasize the responsibility of all Kenyans—politicians, activists, jour-
nalists, bloggers, and voters—to avoid activities that undermine peace.
Against this backdrop, the ongoing ICC cases against Uhuru Kenyatta
and William Ruto—who had come together in the Jubilee Alliance—
helped to shape the way in which the peace narrative evolved. In short,
the Jubilee Alliance and its supporters were motivated to guard against
violence as a means to undermine the ICC’s case against their leaders,68
while journalists and civil society activists were trained on their responsi-
bility not to publish stories or broadcast messages that might promote vio-
lence lest they also be held to account.69 More generally, the conﬁrmation
of charges against some of those alleged to be responsible for facilitating
violence in 2007/2008 emphasized that personal responsibility should be
understood as a legal imperative as much as a moral one.70
This emphasis on the role of the individual in ensuring peace was then
reinforced by popular strands of evangelical religious thought, which
shaped popular discourse through a variety of channels. According to
these theological perspectives, in the face of problems or “evil” it is the
individual, rather than the broader socio-economic or political context,
that is tasked with eﬀecting change through the redemptive power of wel-
coming Christ in and casting the devil out.71 The heavy focus of this reli-
gious teaching on the internal moral work done by the individual,
combined with prosecution of those accused of inciting the 2007/8 clashes
and memories of that crisis, left Kenyans in no doubt about their personal
responsibility in assisting the country to avoid electoral violence.
67. Nic Cheeseman, Gabrielle Lynch and Justin Willis, ‘Decentralization in Kenya: The
governance of governors’, Journal of Modern African Studies 54, 1 (2016), pp. 1–35, p. 10.
68. Sabine Höhn, ‘New start or false start? The ICC and electoral violence in Kenya’,
Development and Change 45, 3 (2014), pp. 565–588.
69. Cheeseman, Mwende and Ouma, ‘Peace but at what cost?’.
70. The cases against Kenyatta and Ruto later collapsed, but not until well after the
election.
71. Gregory Deacon, ‘Driving the Devil Out: Kenya’s Born-Again Election’, Journal of
Religion in Africa 45, 2 (2015), pp. 200–220; Gregory Deacon and Gabrielle Lynch,
‘Allowing Satan in? Moving toward a political economy of neo-Pentecostalism in Kenya’,
Journal of Religion in Africa 43, 2 (2013), pp. 108–130.
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A similar combination of factors has played out in Uganda and Ghana
where a deep-rooted scepticism about politics and the political class—
together with the prevalence of evangelical ideas and rituals—has meant
that much of the responsibility for peace has been placed on individuals at
all levels of society. Thus, ahead of Uganda’s 2016 polls, President
Museveni made repeated calls for individual citizens to keep the peace,72
while civil society organizations launched a ‘Let peace prevail’ campaign
that ‘called upon every individual and organization to ensure that they
work towards a peaceful electoral process’.73 Similarly, while Ghanaian
elections have often witnessed demands for a credible process and social
inclusion,74 there has also been a tendency for the focus of messaging to
shift to the responsibility of individual citizens and politicians to be peace-
ful as the polls draw near. In this vein, a 2016 advert sponsored by the
United Nations Development Programme called on Ghanaians to ‘go to
our polling stations, join the queues, wait our turn, and vote peacefully for
our preferred candidates’. Such an approach was said to be essential, since
‘when the dust settles Ghana must be the only winner. This responsibility
to our country is sacred. Shun violence. Vote in peace. Love Ghana’.75
This individualization of the responsibility to promote and maintain
peace is signiﬁcant, because it helps to explain how peace campaigns,
which stem from a deep fear of disorder, come to emphasize the roles and
duties of ordinary citizens. Maintaining peace comes to be viewed not
simply as something that is the preserve of governments or political lea-
ders, but as the individual duty of every citizen, which feeds into wide-
spread messaging that seeks to discipline the entire population. It is also
important not to underestimate the impact of such messages, given that
they are communicated to voters’ day and night through multiple
mediums from radios and televisions to mobile phones and social media,
from church services and prayer meetings to community functions and
popular discourse, and from political speeches and government advertis-
ing to civil society statements and donor pronouncements. However, this
emphasis on individual responsibility can also be used to the advantage of
incumbents as—in the name of order and stability—government’s can
take action against those who they claim represent a threat to peace.
72. Alava and Ssentongo, ‘Religious (de)politicisation in Uganda’s 2016 elections’.
73. Uganda National NGO Forum, ‘Civil society launch the “let peace prevail” campaign’,
19 February 2016, <http://ngoforum.or.ug/civil-society-launch-the-let-peace-prevail-
campaign-2016/> (11 January 2017).
74. Salihu et al, ‘Conclusion’, p. 195; also Asamoah ‘Demons of transitional democracies’,
p. 47.
75. UNDP, ‘Ghana Election Advert’, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
vSIBZlZiPNk> (11 January 2017).
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International support
Although the rise of peace messaging has been internally driven, it has
often been externally funded with peace programmes supported by a
range of international actors—from bi-lateral and multi-lateral aid agen-
cies, such as USAID and UNDP, to international non-governmental
organizations, such as World Vision and Saferworld. In Kenya, the inter-
national community has been involved in supporting peaceful elections at
least since the return of multi-party politics, through the civic education
programmes of the early 1990s and through (limited) ﬁnancial support to
local organizations’ reconciliation eﬀorts following the ethnic clashes of
1991 to 1993.76 However, international support for peace messaging
reached a peak between the country’s 2007 and 2013 elections, as various
actors sought to avoid a repeat of the 2007/8 post-election violence. Most
notably, the US government provided more than $150 million to Kenya
between these two elections through the Democracy, Human Rights and
Governance programme, which included a ‘robust portfolio that supports
peace messaging and conﬂict [early warning and early response] eﬀorts’.77
As USAID recognized:
Others in the donor community also supported the call for peace, both diplomatically and
through development programming. Peace messages were disseminated using all available
methods: SMS (text message) blasts, ﬂiers, radio, TV, billboards, training journalists on
peace messaging, comic books, national TV shows and local engagement of community-
based groups.78
The international community has also been heavily involved in supporting
peace-messaging activities in Ghana. For example, ahead of the country’s
2016 elections, UNDP sought to strengthen the ‘capacity of actors in the
national peace architecture [most notably the National Peace Council] to
prevent and manage electoral and political violence’, and to ‘enhance
peace education’ including through various peace messages.79 Such donor
support for peace messaging has persisted despite mounting criticism that
76. Stephen Brown, ‘Quiet diplomacy and recurring “ethnic clashes” in Kenya’, in
Chandra Lekha Sriram and Karin Wermester (eds), From promise to practice: Strengthening
UN capacities for the prevention of violence conﬂict (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 2004), pp.
69–100.
77. Larry Garber, Elizabeth Dallas and Johanna Wilkie, ‘USAID support for Kenya’s 2013
elections: Rapid assessment review’, (USAID, Washington, February 2014), pp. 5 & 14,
<https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/documents/1866/Kenya%2527s%25202013%
2520Elections.pdf> (11 January 2017).
78. Ibid, p. 14.
79. UNDP, ‘How UNDP supported Ghana’s peaceful election 2016’, 3 January 2017,
<http://www.gh.undp.org/content/ghana/en/home/ourperspective/ourperspectivearticles/2017/
01/03/how-undp-supported-ghana-s-successful-election-2016.html> (11 January 2017); also
USAID Ghana, ‘Annual Report Fiscal Year 2015’, <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/
ﬁles/documents/1860/USAID%20Ghana%20Annual%20Report%202015_with%20508%
20compliance_FINAL%2011.16.2016.pdf> (11 January 2017).
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this strategy tends to overlook the importance of accountability and just-
ice, and encourages ‘strategies of extraversion’ that have distorted civil
society activities.80 Regarding the latter, one common complaint is that
donor funding for peace has gone hand-in-hand with a ‘toolbox’ approach
that has encouraged local organizations to develop similar projects in very
diﬀerent contexts.81 Support for peace messaging has also been said to
encourage African organizations to propose projects focused on peace,
whether these are necessarily merited by the situation on the ground or
not, encouraging an associated ‘peace industry’ even in relatively non-vio-
lent contexts.82
More broadly, funding for peace activities can be seen as one element
of the international community’s oft-criticized tendency to prioritize sta-
bility and order over human rights and democracy. In this vein, Stephen
Brown has detailed European and US acceptance of sub-standard elec-
tions in Kenya in the interests of stability, incremental change and cordial
diplomatic relations.83 Similarly, in neighbouring Uganda, President
Museveni has proven adept at using a record of economic recovery and
issue of regional security to minimize international criticism of his domes-
tic governance record.84
However, it is not true that donors are unaware of these challenges, or
that they employ the same strategies in every context. For example, donor
support for elections in Uganda has come to place less emphasis on peace
messaging over time. This can be seen from the Democratic Governance
Facility—a donor basket established by various European partners in July
2011—which purposefully separated out ‘rights, justice and peace’ as dis-
tinct from ‘deepening democracy’ ahead of the 2016 election. Work on
the latter explicitly emphasized the imperative of working towards political
responsiveness and accountability; a democratic culture, space and values;
and improving the integrity of democratic processes.85 This more
80. Cf. Jean-Francois Bayart, ‘Africa in the world: A history of extraversion’, African
Aﬀairs 99 (2000), pp. 217–267.
81. Patricia Daley, ‘Challenges to peace: Conﬂict resolution in the great lakes region of
Africa’, Third World Quarterly 27, 2 (2006), pp. 303–319.
82. As argued, for example, in the Ghanaian context by Daily Guide, 10 September 2016,
‘Election peace industry’, <http://dailyguideafrica.com/election-peace-industry/> (11 January
2017).
83. Stephen Brown, ‘Authoritarian leaders and multiparty elections in Africa: How foreign
donors help to keep Kenya’s Daniel arap Moi in power’, Third World Quarterly 22, 5 (2001),
pp. 725–739; Stephen Brown and Rosalind Raddatz, ‘Dire consequences or empty threats?
Western pressure for peace, justice and democracy in Kenya’, Journal of Eastern African
Studies 8, 1 (2014), pp. 43–62.
84. Tripp, Museveni’s Uganda; Jonathan Fisher, ‘Managing donor perceptions:
Contextualizing Uganda’s 2007 intervention in Somalia’, African Aﬀairs 111, 444 (2012),
pp. 404–423.
85. Democratic Governance Facility, ‘Areas of Focus’, 2011, <https://www.dgf.ug/areas-
of-focus/deepening-democracy> (11 January 2017).
19FROM PEACE CAMPAIGNS TO PEACEOCRACY
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/afraf/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/afraf/adz019/5536927 by U
niversity of Birm
ingham
 user on 03 O
ctober 2019
balanced approach appears to have been adopted in recognition of how
peace messaging was working to the incumbent’s advantage. In turn,
where money was invested in peace activities, it was largely channelled
through non-state actors, such as the Citizens Election Observation
Network (CEON). This practice stands in marked contrast to the consid-
erable international assistance given to government parastatals such as the
National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) in Ghana in 2016
and NCIC in Kenya in 2013 and 2017.
However, while the donor community learns from experience, it is
unlikely that funding for peace activities will disappear any time soon.
After all, it is well known that violence and political disorder are usually
regarded as signiﬁcantly worse outcomes for donors than democratic
backsliding. Civil war and political instability can lead to the loss of thou-
sands of lives, have adverse consequences for a range of health and educa-
tional indicators, and can also threaten western interests—from business
investments to concerns with regional security and the ‘war on terror’.
Moreover, with limited power to ensure that governments play by the
rules of the game and facing heavy criticism for any actions that are seen
to interfere with state sovereignty, it is far easier for donors to promote
peace than substantive democracy. Nevertheless, while donor support for
peace messaging may be understandable and helps to explain the ubiquity
of peace campaigns across the continent, it has also helped incumbents to
turn such such projects to their own advantage.
The violence of electoral peace
The ability of governments to shape how peace narratives unfold, com-
bined with the individualization of responsibility for peace and the steady
ﬂow of donor funds, is signiﬁcant because it enables more authoritarian
regimes to use the fear of violence as a justiﬁcation to censor and repress
individuals and groups that might cause disorder. In the context of an
election, this may include journalists investigating electoral malpractice,
opposition parties protesting results, and civil society actors who investi-
gate human rights abuses. By legitimizing the marginalization of dissent,
peace narratives may close oﬀ political space and contribute to the advan-
tages of incumbency enjoyed by African governments—advantages that
are signiﬁcant, as sitting presidents win 88 percent of the elections that
they contest.86
The potential for peace strategies to constrain the options available to
opposition parties is well demonstrated by our cases. In all of the most
86. Nic Cheeseman, ‘African elections as vehicles for change,’ Journal of Democracy 21, 4
(2010), pp. 139–153.
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recent elections held in Ghana, Kenya and Uganda, the main fear
expressed by the media and citizens was that opposition candidates would
reject an incumbent victory and then call their supporters out onto the
streets in protests that would degenerate into widespread civil unrest. To
some extent, of course, this is grounded in the knowledge that opposition
leaders rarely win. However, these fears have also been deliberately fos-
tered by ruling parties who have sought to depict their rivals as a threat to
national security and stability. Thus, ahead of Kenya’s 2017 elections, a
Jubilee-funded social media campaign dubbed ‘The Real Raila’ sought to
depict the opposition leader as violent, divisive and ethnically biased.87
Although such strategies have been common across our cases, it is not-
able that such negative depictions and associated delegitimization of pro-
test by opposition elements is interwoven with a much more repressive
logic in Uganda and Kenya than in Ghana. The explanation for this lies in
the quality of democracy and the proximity and intensity of conﬂict in the
three countries. In Kenya and Uganda, limited progress towards demo-
cratic consolidation has resulted in governments who are not willing to
lose power, and who face relatively few barriers to the use of coercion to
retain control. At the same time, recent (Kenya) and particularly intense
(Uganda) civil strife makes it easier for ruling parties to legitimate repres-
sive strategies. This is because in these cases the negative consequences of
conﬂict are fresher in the minds of citizens and journalists, and also
because the international community is more likely to be willing to toler-
ate the closing of political space in the name of regional stability in the
wake of recent or particularly intense unrest.
In this regard, it is signiﬁcant that in recent elections in Kenya and
Uganda, the ruling party has called on citizens to unite behind the govern-
ment in the interests of stability and development, and to stave oﬀ chaos
and disorder, in language which echoes that of the 1960s and 1970s.88
For example, during Uganda’s 2016 elections there was a strong push by
President Museveni and the NRM to assert how they had brought peace
to the country; how only the NRM could maintain that peace; how any-
one who threatened to cause chaos would be dealt with accordingly; and
how, if the government were to lose the election, the country could return
to war. Such messaging was supported by a public relations campaign that
featured vivid images of the country’s past. This included the NRM’s
decision to run adverts that featured pictures of piles of skulls belonging
to the victims of the civil war of the early 1980s—a technique ﬁrst used
87. Privacy International, ‘Kenya President’s viral ‘anonymous’ attack campaign against
rival, new investigation reveals’, 15 December 2017 <https://privacyinternational.org/feature/
954/texas-media-company-hired-trump-created-kenyan-presidents-viral-anonymous-attack>
(11 March 2019).
88. Lynch, ‘Democratisation in trouble’.
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in 1996.89 The same strategy was also deployed in 2001, when the NRM
repeatedly accused opponents of seeking to bring kavuyo, or ‘chaos’, while
the army—which is deeply entwined with the ruling party—asserted its
right to ‘stamp down violence’ in the interests of peace.90 Each time, the
warning that a vote for the opposition would lead to chaos was combined
with a powerful display of force by the state, which included the deploy-
ment of thousands of security forces, organization of politicized commu-
nity policing eﬀorts, intimidation of journalists and civil society activists,
and arrest of opposition politicians.
Signiﬁcantly, these eﬀorts to politicize and manipulate the peace narra-
tive have also been reinforced—sometimes intentionally, sometimes unin-
tentionally—by the work of non-state actors. This was evident, for
example, ahead of the country’s 2001 polls when the chair of the Electoral
Commission ‘appealed to Museveni to ensure peace and harmony so as to
save the democratic process from disintegration’.91 Similarly, Henni
Alava and Jimmy Ssentongo argue that the pre-electoral messaging by the
country’s clergy in 2016 placed an ‘over-emphasis on peace’ that helped
to shut down political debate, and which ‘underemphasised the violence
that undergirds’ the Ugandan political system.92
As we have seen, a similar albeit less extreme scenario played out in the
Kenyan context ahead of the 2013 elections, when a particular framing of
the “good citizen” helped to constrain the scope of legitimate political
debate and contestation.93 More speciﬁcally, pervasive peace messaging
helped to ensure that opposition supporters and the media felt con-
strained in what and how they could protest or report, as the imperative of
peace-at-all-costs ‘suppressed frank discussion of critical reform issues’
during the campaigns.94 Among other things, this led media houses to
engage in extensive self-censorship and to heavily emphasize peace to the
neglect of reportage and eﬀorts to expose the abuse of power.95 The
89. Rebecca Tapscott, ‘Where the wild things are not: crime preventers and the 2016
Ugandan elections’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 10, 4 (2017), pp. 693–712, p. 694;
Pauline Bernard, ‘The politics of the Luweero skulls: the making of memorial heritage and
post-revolutionary state legitimacy over the Luweero mass graves in Uganda’, Journal of
Eastern African Studies 11, 1 (2017), pp. 188–209.
90. New Vision, 10 February 2001, ‘Bidandi warns over alliances’, p. 5; New Vision, 27
February 2001, advertisement New Vision, 8 March 2001, ‘UPDF deploys for elections’, p. 1.
91. New Vision, 26 February 2001, Kasujja wants military out of campaign’, p. 1.
92. Alava and Ssentongo, ‘Religious (de)politicisation’, pp. 684 & 882.
93. Jessica Pykett, Michael Saward and Anja Schaefer, ‘Framing the good citizen’, British
Journal of Politics and International Relations 12, 4 (2010), pp. 523–538.
94. International Crisis Group, ‘Kenya’s 2013 Elections’, Africa Report No. 197, 17 January 2013
<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/kenya-s-2013-elections> (11 March 2019), p. 3.
95. Elder et al, Elections and violent conﬂict in Kenya, p. 13; Sammy Gakero Gachigua, ‘Fueling
the violence: the print media in Kenya’s volatile 2007 post-election violence’, in Godwin
Murunga, Duncan Okello and Anders Sjögren (eds) Kenya: The struggle for constitutional order
(Zed Books, London, 2014), pp. 44–65; Galava, ‘From watchdogs to hostages of peace’.
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common complaint was that the media had ‘gagged itself … for [the] sake
of peace’.96
The peace narrative around Kenya’s 2013 election also helped to justify a
large-scale deployment of security forces in opposition strongholds during
both the announcement of the election results and Supreme Court decision
on the opposition’s petition against the oﬃcial result. It was also invoked to
legitimate an unconstitutional ban on political meetings and demonstra-
tions in the wake of the elections on the basis that they constituted a threat
to peace. The latter followed the announcement of a shoot-on-sight policy
for those causing ‘unrest’ by the head of police, and was accompanied by
the use of force to quell dissent when it occurred—with six conﬁrmed fatal
police shootings during the demonstrations that followed the Supreme
Court’s validation of the presidential election on 30 March 2013.97 This
fostered unease over the ‘tyranny of peace messaging’, as many ‘resigned
themselves to the fate of the numbers game and to the apparent violence of
proﬁciency and procedure’.98 A similar scenario played out in 2017, when
limited protests in opposition areas following the announcement of
President Kenyatta’s re-election on 11 August were met with a heavy-
handed security response against both protestors and those perceived as
potential protestors, resulting in the fatal shooting of at least 24 citizens in
that weekend alone and the beating of many others. Further deaths
occurred around the time of the fresh elections in October and subsequent
announcement of the presidential election results.99
The situation in Ghana has been very diﬀerent. There, a series of transfers
of power have increased elite trust in the political system, while the low levels
of violence around elections limit what the ruling party of the time can claim
to be necessary in the interests of peace. At the same time, the emergence of
more independent political institutions has reduced the executive’s ability to
manipulate the security forces for partisan ends.100 Partly as a result, peace
narratives have been vibrant but less problematic and have historically been
pushed by politicians from across the partisan divide in very similar language.
Today, it is relatively rare for candidates to be targeted, or for opposition
supporters to be systematically beaten and harassed, on the basis that they
constitute a threat to peace. Instead, demonstrating a strong personal com-
mitment to peace and upholding the country’s constitution has become part
of the way in which elites seek to present themselves as good and patriotic
leaders capable of building and developing the country.
96. Interview, clergyman, Eldoret, 26 March 2013.
97. Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis, ‘Democracy and its discontents’.
98. Chome, ‘Democracy and the tyranny of numbers’.
99. KNCHR, Mirage at Dusk; Patrick Mutahi & Mutuma Ruteere, ‘Violence, security and
the policing of Kenya’s 2017 elections’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 13, 2 (2019), pp.
253–271.
100. Arthur, ‘Democratic consolidation in Ghana’.
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However, even in Ghana, where these processes have been relatively
benign, a preoccupation with peace has led to episodes in which evidence
of electoral manipulation and the abuse of power have been overlooked.
As one candidate in the 2016 elections in Cape Coast explained: ‘most
civil society organisations and institutions preach peace, peace … but
when the Electoral Commission [does something that contravenes the
rules and so threatens to undermine the quality of democracy] … these
organisations … they all remain mute … just preaching peace’.101 The
implication: an emphasis on peace aﬀects ideas of legitimate and illegitim-
ate behaviour in ways that can help to limit political action and justify
state violence. The risk that peace messaging will facilitate peaceocracy is
particularly acute in countries with a recent history of violence and a
strong authoritarian government, as under these conditions incumbents
are both more likely to try, and to be able, to eﬀectively abuse the idea of
peace to strengthen their own position and close oﬀ the political space
available to their opponents and critics.
Conclusion: guarding against peaceocracy
This article has argued that peace campaigns in sub-Saharan Africa result
from ﬁve inter-related factors: the ideal of orderly elections and potential
to instrumentalize peace encourages a diverse range of actors to invest
their time and energy in such campaigns; a fear that elections will descend
into violence guarantees a responsive public; the diﬃculty of addressing
the underlying drivers of violence encourages an individualization of
responsibility; and donor funding helps to ensure the pervasiveness of
peace campaigns. In this way, our analysis has underscored how peace
campaigns have been so durable precisely because they have been driven
both from within and from without, are communicated through multiple
channels including religious leaders and the mass media, and resonate
with the concerns of individual citizens as well as with the self-interest of
politicians. This is not to say that such narratives are present everywhere
—there was less evidence of such a preoccupation in the most recent elec-
tion in Namibia, for example—but especially where elections are keenly
contested they are remarkably common.
There is much that is positive about this trend. Peace messaging
appears to have contributed to lower levels of violence around elections in
Kenya in 2013,102 Nigeria in 2015,103 and the peaceful transfer of power
101. Interview, Political candidate, Cape Coast, Ghana, 28 November 2016.
102. Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis, ‘Democracy and its discontents’.
103. Orji and Iwuamadi, ‘Conﬂict mitigation in Nigeria’s 2015 elections’.
24 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/afraf/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/afraf/adz019/5536927 by U
niversity of Birm
ingham
 user on 03 O
ctober 2019
in Ghana in 2016.104 However, an emphasis on peace can be problematic,
because it may strengthen the hand of authoritarian governments and so
facilitate the emergence of a peaceocracy , in which the fear of conﬂict is
used to prioritize stability and order to the detriment of democracy. The
power of this discourse and attendant insistence on peace and reconcili-
ation lie, at least in part, in the vivid memories of violence and instability
that exist in many countries, and in the diﬃculty of contesting these nar-
ratives. It is diﬃcult and often dangerous for individuals to publicly set
themselves against peace, reconciliation and order; or for their opposites:
violence, division and disorder. As a result, pro-democracy activists and
engaged academics have often struggled to challenge the emergence of
peaceocracy.
Signiﬁcantly, most of the factors that we argue drive an emphasis on
peace have been features of African politics for some time, and radical
change seems unlikely any time soon. Given this, it is worrying that peace
messaging has worked to silence dissent in countries such as Uganda and
Kenya, where democracy is already relatively weak. In these competitive-
authoritarian states—of which there are many on the continent—the
promise of peace is interwoven with the threat of repression. Under these
conditions, peace campaigns become less likely to genuinely resolve exist-
ing disputes and societal tensions, and more likely to store up further grie-
vances and problems for the future. It is therefore imperative that
academics, activists and domestic and international players re-think how
best to promote peace without eroding democracy.
104. Emmanuel Gymiah-Boadi, ‘A peaceful turnover in Ghana’, Journal of Democracy 12,
2 (2001), pp. 103–117.
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